craigm1841

all this talk about IDs and what you can and cant do. fact is, everyone gets behind a keyboard on a message forum and suddenly has a masters in crimanal justice and a law degree. makes me laugh.

porsche911targa

No, I do not purport to have a masters in criminal justice and a law degree. In fact, I was wrong. In Italy the age requirement for ID is 15:

http://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carta_d%27identit%C3%A0

The way they get you is that "L?autorit? di pubblica sicurezza, nell?ambito delle proprie competenze, ha la facolt? di ordinare ad un individuo pericoloso o sospetto di munirsi di una carta di identit? e di esibirla ad ogni richiesta degli ufficiali di pubblica sicurezza" meaning the the police has the authority to order a suspicious or dangerous individual to carry an ID and show it upon request.

I would think that someone walking in the middle of the night for no apparent reason might be deemed suspicious and therefore since the language exists in their code of law, the cop can give them as much or as little hard time as he/she deems necessary.

How do I know that? I lived there for 16 years, so that kind of makes me knowledgeable about their requirements.

BetterMakeWay

+1 This is just one of those little things that rarely rejoices me that i don't live in such a place.

I wonder if the same thing happens in Germany?! I don't think so...

craigm1841

Now I am confused. Krozi is in florida...

The Past:

On the topic of carrying an ID card... US Persons are not required to carry an ID, and those who do not ARE NOT considered vagrants, and havent been since the FL Vagrancy Statute 856.02 was overturned. see Papachristou v. Jacksonville.

The Present and Future:

"In France and many other countries, citizens and travelers alike are required to have their identification on their person at all times. In the U.S., however, that is not the case. We live in a society that prizes the right to privacy, of which anonymity is a facet.

This may soon change. This Term, in the case of Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, the Supreme Court will decide a case that asks the following question: Does the Constitution permit a police officer to arrest someone simply because, when stopped under reasonable suspicion, that person fails to produce identification?

The federal judicial Circuits have split on this issue. The Tenth Circuit has upheld a similar statute in Oliver v. Woods, while the Ninth Circuit has struck another down in Carey v. Nevada Gaming Control Board. The Nevada Supreme Court -- which issued the decision the Supreme Court is reviewing -- has already held that this type of arrest does not violate the Constitution.

It would be a serious mistake for the Supreme Court to agree. Because the standard for reasonable suspicion is very low, the upshot of such a decision would be to require all citizens, immigrants, and travelers in America to carry identification at all times -- and to be prepared to produce it for inspection.

The Low Standard of Reasonable Suspicion

Reasonable suspicion is an extremely low standard -- even lower than probable cause. In practice, it merely requires the police officer to be able to articulate some reason why he found you suspicious -- which is generally very easy to do, particularly under the vaguely defined "totality of the circumstances" test that is used.

Under the leading Supreme Court decision in Terry v. Ohio, passing by the same storefront too many times can trigger "reasonable suspicion." Under the recent Supreme Court decision Illinois v. Wardlow, it may trigger reasonable suspicion if, in a dangerous area of town, a person runs when he sees a police officer approaching. Under a case decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, United States v. Cruz, simply walking alongside the wrong acquaintance can trigger "reasonable suspicion." Racial profiling can be factor when articulating reasonable suspicion, as can the crime rate of the neighborhood you are in or the activities of people you know.

In sum, no one can be sure he or she will not trigger "reasonable suspicion," in the eyes of a police officer (and in the eyes of the law). Suppose that the Supreme Court affirms the decision in Hiibel that "reasonable suspicion" plus the failure to produce identification can constitutionally lead to arrest. If so, all Americans will be well-advised to carry I.D. at all times.

Otherwise, they may risk unwittingly triggering "reasonable suspicion," and thus being arrested merely, in effect, for failure to produce identification."

FROM

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/student...12_sucher.html




Good Reading on this topic in the argument FOR krozi:

SMITH v. FLORIDA, 405 U.S. 172 (1972)

Johnson v. Florida, 391 U.S. 596

Man WRONGFULLY arrested in Ohio for failure to show ID



HOWEVER, in NEVADA, in the strictest of the laws I can find, you are ONLY required to verbally indetify yourself (attached case syllabus)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

HIIBEL v. SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
NEVADA, HUMBOLDT COUNTY, et al.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

No. 03?5554. Argued March 22, 2004?Decided June 21, 2004

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Petitioner Hiibel was arrested and convicted in a Nevada court for refusing to identify himself to a police officer during an investigative stop involving a reported assault. Nevada?s ?stop and identify? statute requires a person detained by an officer under suspicious circumstances to identify himself. The state intermediate appellate court affirmed, rejecting Hiibel?s argument that the state law?s application to his case violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed.

Held: Petitioner?s conviction does not violate his Fourth Amendment rights or the Fifth Amendment?s prohibition on self-incrimination. Pp. 3?13.

(a) State stop and identify statutes often combine elements of traditional vagrancy laws with provisions intended to regulate police behavior in the course of investigatory stops. They vary from State to State, but all permit an officer to ask or require a suspect to disclose his identity. In Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 167?171, this Court invalidated a traditional vagrancy law for vagueness because of its broad scope and imprecise terms. The Court recognized similar constitutional limitations in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52, where it invalidated a conviction for violating a Texas stop and identify statute on Fourth Amendment grounds, and in Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, where it invalidated on vagueness grounds California?s modified stop and identify statute that required a suspect to give an officer ?credible and reliable ? identification when asked to identify himself, id., at 360. This case begins where those cases left off. Here, the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment requirements noted in Brown. Further, Hiibel has not alleged that the Nevada statute is unconstitutionally vague, as in Kolender. This statute is narrower and more precise. In contrast to the ?credible and reliable? identification requirement in Kolender, the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted the instant statute to require only that a suspect disclose his name. It apparently does not require him to produce a driver?s license or any other document. If he chooses either to state his name or communicate it to the officer by other means, the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs. Pp. 3?6.

(b) The officer?s conduct did not violate Hiibel?s Fourth Amendment rights. Ordinarily, an investigating officer is free to ask a person for identification without implicating the Amendment. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216. Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, the Court has recognized that an officer?s reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further. Although it is well established that an officer may ask a suspect to identify himself during a Terry stop, see, e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229, it has been an open question whether the suspect can be arrested and prosecuted for refusal to answer, see Brown, supra, at 53, n. 3. The Court is now of the view that Terry principles permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop. Terry, supra, at 34. The Nevada statute is consistent with Fourth Amendment prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures because it properly balances the intrusion on the individual?s interests against the promotion of legitimate government interests. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654. An identity request has an immediate relation to the Terry stop?s purpose, rationale, and practical demands, and the threat of criminal sanction helps ensure that the request does not become a legal nullity. On the other hand, the statute does not alter the nature of the stop itself, changing neither its duration nor its location. Hiibel argues unpersuasively that the statute circumvents the probable-cause requirement by allowing an officer to arrest a person for being suspicious, thereby creating an impermissible risk of arbitrary police conduct. These familiar concerns underlay Kolender, Brown, and Papachristou. They are met by the requirement that a Terry stop be justified at its inception and be ?reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified? the initial stop. Terry, 392 U.S., at 20. Under those principles, an officer may not arrest a suspect for failure to identify himself if the identification request is not reasonably related to the circumstances justifying the stop. Cf. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817. The request in this case was a commonsense inquiry, not an effort to obtain an arrest for failure to identify after a Terry stop yielded insufficient evidence. The stop, the request, and the State?s requirement of a response did not contravene the Fourth Amendment. Pp. 6?10.

? Hiibel?s contention that his conviction violates the Fifth Amendment?s prohibition on self-incrimination fails because disclosure of his name and identity presented no reasonable danger of incrimination. The Fifth Amendment prohibits only compelled testimony that is incriminating, see Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598, and protects only against disclosures that the witness reasonably believes could be used in a criminal prosecution or could lead to other evidence that might be so used, Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 445. Hiibel?s refusal to disclose was not based on any articulated real and appreciable fear that his name would be used to incriminate him, or that it would furnish evidence needed to prosecute him. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486. It appears he refused to identify himself only because he thought his name was none of the officer?s business. While the Court recognizes his strong belief that he should not have to disclose his identity, the Fifth Amendment does not override the Nevada Legislature?s judgment to the contrary absent a reasonable belief that the disclosure would tend to incriminate him. Answering a request to disclose a name is likely to be so insignificant as to be incriminating only in unusual circumstances. See, e.g., Baltimore City Dept. of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555. If a case arises where there is a substantial allegation that furnishing identity at the time of a stop would have given the police a link in the chain of evidence needed to convict the individual of a separate offense, the court can then consider whether the Fifth Amendment privilege applies, whether it has been violated, and what remedy must follow. Those questions need not be resolved here. 10?13.

118 Nev. 868, 59 P.2d 1201, affirmed.

Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and O?Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.

-------


Things are how they are now because:

"The abuse of vagrancy laws by the police throughout the United States was common. Such laws were vague and undefined, allowing police to arrest persons merely on the suspicion they were about to do something illegal. In 1972 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this problem in Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S. Ct. 839, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110. The Court ruled that a Florida vagrancy statute was unconstitutional because it was too vague to be understood. The Court emphasized that members of the public cannot avoid engaging in criminal conduct, if prior to engaging in it, they cannot determine that the conduct is forbidden by law. The Court also concluded that the vagrancy law's vagueness lent itself to Arbitrary enforcement: police, prosecutors, and juries could enforce the law more stringently against one person than against another, even though the two individuals' conduct was similar.

After Papachristou the validity of vagrancy statutes was put in doubt. Prosecutions for vagrancy must now be tied to observable acts, such as public begging. Prosecutions are rare, however, because local governments do not want to spend their financial resources incarcerating persons for such offenses."



WHAT is boils down to is YOU DO NOT NEED TO PROVIDE ID, in some states and cases you are required to identify yourself just by providing a name. If you have commited a crime and you dont provide an ID, you will be taken in and they will get your ID eventually, weather it be by on you own accord or your fingerprints or whatever method they legally use.

hope this helps!

Krozi

wow, I think you just beat the record for longest post or something
Thanks for taking the time and thanks for the support

craigm1841

slow day at work.

CWS530

Really, because it looks like you have a master's in criminal justice or a law degree or something Craig!

sdg1871

Well written. This a better work product than I get from some of my associates. Are you a criminal lawyer?

craigm1841

it is a hobby, I did study criminal justice when before I was in college. I am more of a "research hobbyist" I get bored and spend hours studying a subject.

craigm1841

I wish I was. i am a bum with about 60 college credits... A lot of that is a copy and paste job. Like I said, i love researching Law is something that interests me. (edited)